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We study how the shadow economy affects pollution and how this effect depends on 
corruption levels in public administration. Production in the shadow economy allows firms to 
avoid environmental regulation policies; a large informal sector may be accompanied by 
higher pollution levels. Our theoretical model predicts that controlling the levels of corruption 
can limit the effect of the shadow economy on pollution. We use panel data covering the 
period from 1999–2005 from more than 100 countries to test this theoretical prediction. Our 
estimates confirm that the relationship between the shadow economy and the levels of 
pollution are dependent on the levels of corruption. Our results hold when we control for the 
effects of other determinants of pollution, time varying common shocks, country-fixed effects 
and various additional covariates. 
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1.  Introduction 
Water quality and air pollution have become serious problems in many developing countries. 
Human waste, fertilizers and industrial chemicals contaminate drinking water and cause 
significant health problems. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), water 
pollution is one of the main health risks and leads to approximately 2 million deaths annually. 
Air pollution causes about the same number of premature deaths worldwide per year. Pictures 
of megacities clouded by heavy fog, for instance, in China and Iran have appeared in 
newspapers around the world.
1 These problems are the negative effects of rapid growth driven 
by the extensive use of coal and fossil fuel.  
Many of these environmental problems are fostered to a significant extent by the sizeable 
shadow economies in developing and emerging countries.
2 From 1999-2006, more than 50% 
of the overall GDP in Ukraine, Tanzania, Peru, Panama, Guatemala, Georgia and Bolivia 
originated in the shadow economy (Schneider et al., 2010). Between 1999 and 2006, the 
activity of shadow economies generated on average 34.5% of the official GDP in over 162 
countries (Schneider et al., 2010).
3 Figure 1 shows the average, minimum and maximum size 
of the shadow economy in the different regions.  
The environmental hazards of the informal sector can be significant (Blackman, 2000). The 
shadow economy includes many pollution intensive activities, such as leather tanning, brick 
making, metal working, resource extraction, urban transportation with old and inefficient 
vehicles and production in small scale or family-based factories. In general, these firms do not 
follow environmental standards. The artisanal mining of gold, for example, uses mercury, 
which is discharged into rivers (Dondeyne et al., 2009). Bleaching, dyeing and tanning all 
produce dangerous chemicals, which can pollute rivers and groundwater (Baksi and Bose, 
2010). Informal transportation in most developing countries is one of the main causes of local 
                                                 
1 Official Iranian sources report that approximately 10,000 people died due to the effects of pollution in 2005-06, 
calling living in Tehran a “collective suicide”. Approximately 70% of Tehran air pollution comes from the 
transport sector where the informal transport plays a major role. (See 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6245463.stm).  
2 A common definition of the shadow economy is “all economic activities that contribute to the officially 
calculated (or observed) gross national product but are currently unregistered” (e.g., Feige 1994, Schneider 
1994). For a survey of the shadow economies around the world, see Schneider and Enste (2000). 
3 Employment in the informal economy is significant in many of these countries. More than 70% of all 
employment comes from the activity of the shadow economy in countries, such as Zambia (80.7%), Uganda 
(83.7%), Thailand (72.1%), Nepal (73.3%), Lithuania (72%), Ghana (78.5%) and Gambia (72.4%) (ILO, 2010). 2 
 
air pollution (SO2 emission). Vehicles in the informal transportation sector are usually old, 
poorly maintained and do not meet environmental quality standards.
4  
Figure 1. Size of the Shadow Economy (% of GDP) around the World (1999-2005) 
 
Source: Schneider et al. (2010) and authors’ calculations.  
Surprisingly, there is still a lack of theoretical and empirical research on the shadow 
economy-environment nexus. A few theoretical studies (Baksi and Bose, 2010; Chaudhuri 
and Mukhopadhyay, 2006) analyze the effectiveness of environmental regulation on informal 
sectors. One of the key insights is that higher regulatory pressures may induce firms to shift 
more activities to the shadow economy.
5 Unless governments fight the informal activities of 
shadow economies, they may not be able to implement effective environmental policies. Our 
model shows a similar effect of regulatory evasion. In addition, we account for the role of 
political and administrative corruption in the shadow economy-pollution nexus. Regulatory 
control is further weakened when economic agents in the informal economy can bribe corrupt 
                                                 
4 For more information on informal transport in developing countries, see a report by the UN-HABITAT at 
http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss/listItemDetails.aspx?publicationID=1534 
5 Pollution leakage can also occur without the informal sector if environmental regulations differ between 
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regulatory officials, which enables firms to continue their polluting activities in the shadow 
economy even after detection.
6 We show that the destructive effects of the shadow economy 
are higher in countries with pervasive corruption. From a policy maker’s perspective, fighting 
corruption may help to reduce the detrimental effects of the shadow economy on the 
environment. 
In the literature, case and country studies provide evidence for the detrimental effects of the 
informal sector on pollution. For example, Blackman and Bannister (1998) and Blackman 
(2000) investigate the adaptation of propane by traditional brick makers in Mexico. Lahiri-
Dutt (2004) examines informal mining in Asia and Biller (1994) describes the environmental 
hazards of informal gold mining in Brazil.
7 What is missing in the literature is a 
comprehensive, cross-country analysis of informal sector activities and environmental 
pollution. In our empirical model, we test the extent to which the informal sector contributes 
to pollution and corruption undermines environmental policy.
8 We use panel data covering 
the period from 1999-2005 for more than 100 countries. We find that the larger the shadow 
economy, the greater the pollution. However, this effect can be moderated by controlling 
corruption. Our results hold when we control for other major economic and demographic 
determinants of pollution, such as time varying common shocks, regional fixed effects and 
various additional covariates. We show the results for high-income and low-income countries 
separately to explore the possible differences between developed and developing countries.  
The contributions of this paper are two-fold. First, we present a simple theoretical model that 
clearly demonstrates why we should expect the effect of the shadow economy on pollution to 
depend on the level of corruption. Second, we show that the theoretical effect of corruption on 
the shadow economy and pollution is empirically relevant. The remainder of the paper is 
structured as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical model, which provides comparative 
statics that yield testable implications for subsequent analysis. Section 3 discusses our 
empirical strategy and the data. Section 4 presents the empirical evidence. Section 5 contains 
various tests of robustness and Section 6 concludes. 
                                                 
6 The direct link between corruption and pollution is discussed elsewhere; see Lopez and Mitra (2000) for a 
theoretical analysis and Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2006) or Welsch (2004) for empirical studies. 
7 Veiga et al. (1994) point out that high mercury levels in the blood of fish-eating people in the Amazon are due 
to gold mining activities in the informal economy. 
8 We discuss the literature on the determinants of pollution in Section 3. 4 
 
2. The  Model 
This section develops a simple model of production with pollution, which can take place in 
the formal and informal sectors. Administrative corruption may allow firms in the informal 
sector to circumvent environmental regulations without being punished. 
The output x of a representative firm can be produced in both the formal and informal sectors: 
          , where    and    are the outputs in the formal and informal sectors, respectively. 
The basic difference between these sectors is that the formal sector complies with all 
governmental regulations, while the informal sector can illegally bypass them. As production 
generates negative environmental externalities, the government tries to restrict and monitor 
the production of x. Without abatement, each unit of output x produces one unit of 
environmental pollution. The government sets the level of abatement    0,1 . The case of 
  0   indicates no abatement. For   1 , there is complete control of pollution. When 
governmental regulation is in place, the degree of pollution for each unit of output is 1-e. For 
the firm, the effort to reduce pollution comes at a cost of      per unit of x (with a’>0 and 
a”0) along with the marginal cost of production. The production cost is given by      with 
           "    > 0. The price of output is normalized to unity. 
The cost of reducing pollution may tempt producers to move to informal production in the 
shadow economy. Shifting part of the production to the informal sector saves the producers 
the abatement costs on the amount of goods produced because the shadow economy does not 
require compliance with regulations. However, the government is aware of this possibility and 
monitors the production process. Thus, firms face the risk of detection. The probability of 
detection  p depends on the size of informal production    . Therefore,             with 
     0, "   0,  0       0    0. 
However, not all monitoring officials are honest. In our model, the share of corrupt officials is 
. Once a firm’s illegal pollution is detected, the subsequent punishment depends on the type 
of monitoring official. If the monitor is honest, the firm loses all of its informal output (  ) 
and the penalty is      .
9 However, if a dishonest producer meets a corrupt monitoring 
official, the firm can pay a bribe (  ) to avoid legal consequences: L =  . The bribe will be 
determined by bilateral bargaining between the two parties. 
                                                 
9 We employ here a special punishment function because the firm loses all output in the informal sector. Note, 
however, that any function that links punishment to output and, in case of detection, reduces the net value below 
the outcome in the formal sector would lead to the same results. 5 
 
To allow for different types of corruption, we assume that corrupt bureaucrats in the formal 
sector may also extort firms. If licenses are required in the formal economy, firms may have 
to bribe corrupt bureaucrats. We assume that a share of  of all bureaucrats in the formal 
economy is corrupt. If a firm meets a corrupt bureaucrat, it has to share its rent from formal 
production with the bureaucrat. The level of the bribe    is again determined by bilateral 
bargaining. 
The timing of the two-stage game is as follows. In stage one, the firm decides on the amount 
of output to be produced formally and informally. In stage two, the output in the informal 
sector may be detected and the firm has to pay either the penalty or the bribe. To bring the 
output in the formal sector to the market, the firm may have to bribe an official. As usual, we 
solve the game by backward induction. 
Stage 2: Average Penalty Costs and Bribes in the Formal Sector 
As the representative entrepreneur is risk neutral, the firm has to consider the average penalty 
        1    ·      ·   . (1) 
With some probability (1-), the firm is detected by an honest official and pays      . With 
probability  , the monitoring official is corrupt. In the case of the corrupt official, the 
equilibrium bribe    is determined through Nash bargaining. By making a bribe agreement, 
the firm avoids paying the penalty      . The impending penalty can be shared between the 
firm and the corrupt official. Hence, the Nash product is 
                   ·   
    ,    (2) 
where  is the bargaining power of the firm.
10 Maximizing (2) with respect to   and solving 
for the equilibrium bribe yields 
    
     1    ·   .  (3) 
The second order condition (SOC) is also satisfied. Substituting the equilibrium bribe, the 
average penalty cost (1) can now be written as 
            1     ·    ·      (4) 
This average penalty has to be paid when the cheating firm gets caught, which happens with 
probability      . 
                                                 
10 The bargaining approach is common in the literature on corruption. The alternative approach is to allow the 
corrupt official to dictate the bribe [e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Choi and Thum (2004)]. In our case, a 
complete extraction of rents can be achieved by setting  = 0.  6 
 
The same bargaining procedure can be applied to determine bribes in the formal sector. The 
value of output in the formal sector amounts to   . Production costs and abatement costs are 
already sunk when the corrupt official makes his demands. The Nash product in the formal 
sector is 
                   ·   
    .   
Hence, the equilibrium bribe becomes 
    
     1    ·   . (5) 
Stage 1: Production in the Formal and Informal Sectors 
The firm maximizes its profit by choosing the total output of x and its division into formal and 
informal production
 11 
                 ·      ·   
          ·                      .  (6) 
Total revenue amounts to         and the firm faces four types of costs: the costs of 
regulating pollution, the expected bribe in the formal sector, the costs in the event of detection 
of informal production and the production costs. When we use the average penalty from 
Equation (4) and the bribe in the formal sector (5) and take the derivative, we obtain 
 
  
   
 1         ·  1            0  and  (7) 
 
  
   
 1  1  ·   ·         ·                      0 . (8) 
Combining Equations (7) and (8) yields 
   1  ·   ·         ·                      ·  1    . (9) 
Equation (7) describes the profit maximizing total output. The marginal revenue net of 
abatement and bribery costs has to be equal to the marginal cost of production.
12 Equation (9) 
shows that the profit maximizing division is achieved when the marginal abatement and 
bribery costs in the formal sector are equal to the marginal costs of detection in the informal 
sector. Figure 2 illustrates this outcome where total output is denoted on the horizontal axis. 
The firm’s optimal output x* is reached when the marginal cost of production (c’) is equal to 
the net benefit from production in the formal sector (     1         ·  1    ). The 
profit maximizing production in the informal sector is illustrated by the intersection of the net 
marginal benefit curves     and      1  1  ·   ·         ·             of the formal 
and informal sectors, respectively. 
                                                 
11 Throughout the paper, we assume that the bargaining power of the corrupt officials is sufficiently low that 
production in the formal and informal sectors remains profitable. 
12 For simplicity, we ignore the corner solution where all production takes place in the informal sector. 7 
 
Figure 2. Profit Maximizing Production in the Formal and Informal Sectors 
 
The comparative statics of the model reveal useful information about the impact of 
environmental regulation on output. The implicit differentiation of Equations (7) and (9) 
yields 
 
   
    
   
 "      0  (10) 
 
   
    
 
    ·  ·          "    ·     0 . (11) 
Equations (10) and (11) depict the contrasting effects of increased regulatory measures on 
formal and informal production. When there is a tighter environmental regulation policy, total 
production (  ) falls and informal production increases. Therefore, production in the formal 
sector must fall. In Figure 2, tighter regulation implies a downward shift of the     curve. 
Proposition 1. In the presence of an informal sector, tighter environmental regulation leads to 
a drop in output in the formal economy and an increase in activity in the shadow economy. 
Emissions 
Studying the impact of environmental regulation on emissions leads us to ask whether 
governments can improve environmental quality through regulatory measures when firms can 
escape regulation in the informal sector. Total emissions (E) are given by 
           1     ·       1     ·   ·   . (12) 
The differentiation of Equation (12) with respect to e shows whether tighter regulations 
reduce emissions and improve environmental quality 
 
  
             1 e   ·
  
     ·
   
     (13) 8 
 
The first two terms on the right-hand side are negative and the third term is positive [see 
Equations (10) and (11)]. The first two terms indicate that emissions fall because output drops 
and because each unit in the formal sector is produced with cleaner technology (   ). The 
negative effect emerges from the inframarginal units that are shifted to the informal sector, 
where they generate extra pollution, . This result leads to our second proposition. 
Proposition 2. In the presence of an informal sector, the (marginal) introduction of 
environmental regulation (  0 ) reduces pollution. In general, the impact of tighter 
environmental regulation on emissions is ambiguous in the presence of an informal sector. 
The Effect of Corruption on Environmental Quality 
Finally, we examine two effects of corruption on environmental quality. First, corruption may 
affect the average penalty in the informal sector. Due to the rent sharing between corrupt 
officials and entrepreneurs, a larger share of corrupt officials increases the incentives for firms 
to move to the informal sector. The implicit differentiation of Equation (9) yields 
 
   
    
 ·       ·         
    ·  ·  ·        "    ·     0 . (14) 
Proposition 3. Increased corruption among the officials who monitor the informal sector 
expands the shadow economy. As total output (x*) is not affected by the degree of corruption, 
total emission increases as informal production goes up. 
Second, corruption may levy a burden on the formal sector. Therefore, we also analyze an 
increase in the share of corrupt officials  who demand payments for granting licenses. The 
differentiation of (9) yields 
 
   
    
   
      ·      "·     0    (15) 
Hence, corruption in the formal sector also drives up informal activities [see also Choi and 
Thum (2005)]. Here, however, the net effect on environmental quality is ambiguous. Taking 
the derivative of (12) with respect to  and substituting (15) yields 
 
  
      1    · 
 
    ·  ·  ·        "    ·     
   
 "  . (16) 
While the first term in brackets is positive, the second term is negative. Again, for e close to 
zero, emissions fall when corruption increases. This result occurs because the negative effect 
of corruption on output dominates the shift in production. 9 
 
Proposition 4. Increased corruption in the formal sector expands the shadow economy. Total 
output (x*) falls with the degree of corruption, so the net effect on total emissions is 
ambiguous. 
3.  Empirical Strategy and Data 
Based on our theoretical model, we formulate the following hypotheses:  
H1: The shadow economy increases pollution. 
H2: Corruption exacerbates the effect of the shadow economy on environmental degradation.  
To test our hypotheses, we use fixed effects panel regressions. We begin by specifying that 
the dependent variable (pollution) is a linear function of our independent variables, such as 
the shadow economy. We then add further explanatory variables based on previous literature. 
To estimate whether the relationship between the shadow economy and pollution varies 
systematically with the level of corruption, we use the following model 
                    ·            ·              ·         ·              ·                    , (17) 
where the subscripts denote the country i and the time period t (1999-2005). em is the 
emission indicator and we use per capita SO2 and CO2 emissions alternatively. se is the share 
of the shadow economy in the GDP. cor is a proxy for the level of corruption and    ·     is 
the interaction term between the shadow economy and corruption. Finally, Z is a vector of 
control variables, such as energy efficiency, trade openness, population density, urbanization, 
working age population (15-64 years), education and quality of political institutions. 
Depending on the specification, the sample size varies between 107 and 134 countries. 
The coefficient 1 measures the marginal effect of the shadow economy (as % of the GDP) on 
pollution in the absence of corruption (cor = 0). Other factors, such as climate and geography, 
are country-specific and may correlate with pollution indicators. Because country-specific 
factors may cause the error terms to be correlated across all periods for a specific country or 
among countries for a particular year, pooled cross section estimates are inefficient (Selden 
and Song, 1994). In this case, the fixed-effect methods allow us to control for individual 
heterogeneity, which reduces the risk of biased results. We allow for country- (ui) and time- 
(t) fixed effects. The former captures unobservable time-invariant country characteristics and 
the latter captures shocks common to all countries. To determine whether fixed effects are 
superior to random effects, we perform the Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978). This 
test rejects the null hypothesis of no correlation between the individual effects and the 10 
 
explanatory variables at the 1% level (p-value = 0). This method suggests that fixed-effect 
models are more appropriate for our investigation than are random-effect regressions.
13 
The interaction term between the shadow economy and corruption captures the extent to 
which corruption increases or lowers the impact of the shadow economy on pollution. At the 
margin, the total effect of the shadow economy on pollution can be calculated by examining 










Thus, our coefficients of interest are β1 and β3. We expect that β1 is significantly positive (i.e., 
a larger informal sector increases pollution). Because corruption lowers the cost of shifting to 
the shadow economy, we expect to find a positive sign for β3 as well.  
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is per capita environmental pollution. We employ the two most 
frequently used measures of air pollution in research: sulfur dioxide (SO2) and carbon dioxide 
(CO2).
14  
SO2 per capita is a widely used indicator of local air pollution. SO2 is the major cause of acid 
rain, which degrades trees, crops, water and soil.
15 It also causes breathing problems, 
exacerbating asthma, chronic bronchitis and respiratory and cardiovascular disease. Smith et 
al. (2011) provide new estimates for global and regional anthropogenic sulfur dioxide 
emissions from 1850-2005. They estimate SO2 emissions annually by country and from the 
following sources: coal combustion, petroleum combustion, natural gas processing and 
combustion, petroleum processing, biomass combustion, shipping bunker fuels, metal 
smelting, pulp and paper processing, other industrial processes and agricultural waste burning 
(AWB). Furthermore, SO2 emissions are calculated annually for the following end-user 
sectors: energy, industry, transportation, domestic and agricultural waste burning (AWB). The 
end-use sectors are selected by Smith et al. (2010) for their standard reporting practice. The 
SO2 emissions used in our estimates are the sum of SO2 emissions from all of these sources 
for each country.  
                                                 
13 Hausman test results are available upon request. 
14 We also examined the effect of the shadow economy on the organic water pollutant (measured by biochemical 
oxygen demand). The effect of the shadow economy is positive (increasing) and statistically significant. The 
results for BOD are available upon request. 
15 http://epi.yale.edu/Metrics/SulfurDioxideEmissions 11 
 
As an alternative indicator, we use (per capita) CO2 emissions, which are a well-known cause 
of global warming.
16 Our source of CO2 emission information is the World Bank (2011). 
Carbon dioxide is generated by the consumption of solid, liquid and gas fuels and gas flaring. 
Therefore, CO2 emissions are calculated primarily with the amount of energy consumption.  
Independent Variables 
The main independent variable is the share of the shadow economy in the GDP. Measuring 
the shadow economy is difficult because it is, by definition, hidden. The most common 
method is Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) modeling, which is a kind of 
structural equation modeling.
17 This method treats the shadow economy as a latent variable, 
quantifying its size based on the main causes and indicators of informal activity in the 
economy. We use the data from Schneider et al. (2010), who employ this method to estimate 
the size of the shadow economy for a number of countries in recent years (1999-2006/07).
18 
Appendix B presents a brief background on the methodology of shadow economy 
estimations. The advantage of structural equation modeling is that it allows us to address the 
measurement error problem. As Chang et al. (2009) note, “the advantage of structural 
equation modeling over traditional regression analysis is that it explicitly models 
measurement errors and can estimate parameters with full information maximum likelihood 
(FIML), which provides consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates”.  
An alternative estimate for the size of informal economy across countries is provided by the 
World Economic Forum (Global Competitiveness Report 2005-2006 and 2006-2007). The 
size of the informal sector variable is constructed from a business survey by the World 
Economic Forum (WEF). The respondents were asked, “How much business activity in your 
country would you estimate to be unofficial or unregistered?” The variable is scaled from 0 to 
100 percent. The correlation between the Schneider measure of the shadow economy and the 
WEF data is fairly high (0.73). The World Economic Forum (Global Competitiveness Report 
2001/2002) also provides tax evasion data for a group of countries based on executives' 
                                                 
16 We prefer the SO2 over the CO2 measure for pollution because SO2 generates local pollution. Hence, both the 
cost and benefits of environmental regulation accrue on the local level. The incentives for lower CO2 emissions 
are less obvious and the costs of regulation are borne by the domestic economy. The benefits, however, accrue to 
the whole world because the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is a contribution to a global public good. We 
report the results with CO2 emissions as an alternative indicator because many other environmental studies focus 
on CO2. 
17 MIMIC models have also been applied to special facets of the shadow economy, such as smuggling (e.g., 
Farzanegan, 2009; Buehn and Farzanegan, 2012). For more details on the theoretical aspect of this methodology, 
see Bollen (1989).  
18 These estimates have been used extensively in other empirical studies, such as Botero et al. (2004). 12 
 
assessments of how important tax evasion is in their countries. Again, the correlation between 
the Schneider estimates and the tax evasion variable is quite high (-0.63). Therefore, we 
believe that the shadow economy measures of Schneider et al. (2010) are reasonable 
indicators for the size of the informal economy across countries and over time.  
To measure corruption, we use the corruption index from the Political Risk Services (PRS). 
This index measures corruption in the political system and business related corruption, such 
as bribes connected to import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, or 
police protection. This index adequately captures the political and economic corruption 
described in our theoretical model. The PRS data has the advantage of covering many 
countries, thereby reducing the risk of a sample selection bias. This index of corruption is 
frequently used in the literature (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1995; Alesina and Weder, 2002; 
Fredriksson and Svensson, 2003; and Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010). The original PRS 
corruption index varies from zero (most corrupt) to six (least corrupt). To interpret 
“increasing corruption,” we recode the index by subtracting the country scores from six such 
that higher values correspond with higher levels of corruption. For robustness analysis, we 
use the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International. This index varies from 
zero (highest degree of corruption) to ten (least corruption). We transform this index such that 
higher scores indicate higher corruption. The CPI index is highly correlated with the actual 
experience of corruption, as measured by the International Crime Victim Survey data 
(Lambsdorff, 2007). Therefore, we are confident that measurement error is a minor issue with 
respect to corruption. 
As an additional control variable, we use the polity index (Marshall et al., 2009) to measure 
democracy. Farzin and Bond (2006), for example, show that economic agents can implement 
their preferences for environmental quality more effectively in democracies than in autocratic 
societies.  
We also control for other important determinants of air pollution. For example, increasing 
integration in the global economy and more openness to trade may play an important role in 
this issue. Cole (2004) suggests that trade openness may reduce pollution because countries 
have improved access to environmentally friendly technologies. However, the opposite effect 
can also occur. According to the pollution haven hypothesis, developed countries may export 
their dirty industries, such as the petrochemical and cement industries, to developing countries 
with lower environmental standards. In such a scenario, higher trade openness may increase 
environmental problems. As a measure of trade openness, we use the share of total trade 13 
 
(imports+exports) in the GDP. In addition, the sectoral structure of the economy may 
influence pollution. In our general empirical specification, we control for the share of 
manufacturing production in the GDP. A higher share of value added in the industry and 
manufacturing may be accompanied by higher emissions (Dinda et al., 2000; Friedl and 
Getzner, 2003). We also account for the efficiency of energy consumption. Increasing energy 
efficiency implies a better use of energy. For a given level of production, improved energy 
efficiency will lead to decrease pollution. Efficiency is measured as GDP per unit of energy 
used. 
We measure the following demographic variables: population density, the share of urban 
population in the total population and the percentage of the total population in the age group 
from 15 to 64 years of age. Urbanization may have mixed effects on the environment. On the 
one hand, increasing urbanization is associated with the intensive use of public and private 
transportation, thus increasing the consumption of fossil fuels (Panayotou, 1997). On the 
other hand, urbanization may facilitate citizen networking and NGO activities against 
industries that pollute heavily (see Rivera-Batiz, 2002; Torras and Boyce, 1998; and Farzin 
and Bond, 2006). Selden and Song (1994) show a negative effect of higher population density 
on the various indicators of pollution. They argue that sparsely populated countries have less 
incentive to reduce the emission per capita at every level of income. We also control for the 
level of education in our estimations. A more highly educated society is expected to be more 
aware of environmental hazards and related health problems (Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2006; 
Farzin and Bond, 2006; and Bimonte, 2002). Scruggs (1998) shows that a higher level of 
education and wealth is associated with pro-environmental policies across all countries. As a 
proxy for the level of education, we use school enrollment rates (gross) at the secondary level. 
Finally, we use the share of the working-age population (15-64 years) as a demographic 
variable. Farzin and Bond (2006) discuss the different ways in which age composition 
influences environmental quality. They note that young people have a larger option value to 
wait for future improvements in environmental quality. In contrast, older people feel the 
health problems of pollution more directly and are willing to increase pressure on the 
government for stricter environmental regulation. However, older people may also be less 
willing to forego current consumption for future improvements in environmental quality. 
Following Grossman and Krueger (1994), we control for the logarithm of GDP per capita (in 
current US dollars) and its square to account for the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) 
hypothesis (for an overview of the EKC literature see Stern, 2004). As Schneider et al. (2010) 14 
 
use GDP per capita as one of the causal variables of the shadow economy in their MIMIC 
models, the inclusion of GDP per capita alongside the shadow economy could inflate the 
standard errors of our estimates. The potential problem of omitted variables, such as historical 
legacies, culture and geographical characteristics, is mitigated by controlling for country and 
time-fixed effects. Appendix A lists all the variables and data sources. Table 1 reports the 
descriptive statistics of the major variables.  
Table 1. Statistical Summary  




log (CO2 per capita) 1126  0.61  1.71  -4.39  4.82 
log (SO2 per capita) 924  -11.43  1.38  -14.79  -8.48 
log (shadow) 1119  3.44  0.44  2.12  4.24 
corruption (rescaled)   973 3.31  1.21  0.00  6.00 
log (shadow) * corruption 930  11.44 4.87  0.00  24.23 
4. Empirical  Results 
SO2 Emissions as a Dependent Variable 
We report the results with SO2 emissions as the dependent variable. Table 2 presents several 
estimates for the nexus between the shadow economy and SO2 emissions while controlling for 
country and time-fixed effects in all specifications. In column S.2.1, we start with a simple 
regression of the effects of the shadow economy and its interaction with corruption on SO2 
emissions. We observe an increasing and statistically significant effect of the shadow 
economy on SO2 that increases at higher levels of corruption. However, this positive 
association may be driven by other omitted factors that influence both the shadow economy 
and local pollution. To address this issue, we follow the specific to general approach (see 
Herwartz, 2010 for more details) and add other important control variables in columns S.2.2-
S.2.9. The positive (increasing) effect of the shadow economy on local pollution and the 
interaction term remain robust in all specifications. Our baseline regression is in column 
S.2.9, where we include all major variables. The coefficient of the shadow economy (shadow) 
is positive and statistically significant, as in the other models, and the coefficient of the 
interaction term is positive and statistically significant (at the 1% level). This result is in line  15 
 
Table 2. Shadow Economy and SO2 Emissions 
Panel with fixed country and time effects (OLS) 
Dependent variable: SO2 emission (gigagrams (Gg) per capita) 
Independent variables  S.2.1 S.2.2 S.2.3 S.2.4 S.2.5  S.2.6  S.2.7 S.2.8 S.2.9  S.2.10 





























































































































































2  0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97  0.97 0.97 0.97  0.97  0.97  0.97 
Observations  818 803 783 783  783 783 735  646  613  625 
Number  of  countries  118 116 115 115  115 115 109  108  105  107 
Note: White robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Constant term is included (not reported). ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 1 Gg = 1000 tons. 16 
 
with our theoretical prediction that corruption amplifies the effect of the shadow economy on 
pollution. In other words, the control of corruption moderates the increasing effect of the 
shadow economy on SO2  emissions. In column S.2.10, we exclude the energy efficiency 
variable from the model because it includes GDP and energy, which are determinants of 
emissions. Therefore, including the energy efficiency in our specification might over-
determine the estimation. However, as we can see from S.2.10, our main results of an 
increasing effect of the shadow economy and the amplifying effect of corruption remain 
robust. With respect to the environmental Kuznets curve, the results show that there is an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between income per capita and local (SO2) emissions. These 
results are in line with the findings of Cole et al. (1997). However, having included the 
shadow economy variable, we should be cautious in interpreting the coefficient of the income 
variables because there is a relatively high correlation between the logarithm of the GDP per 
capita and the logarithm of the shadow economy (-0.68). 
To improve our impression of the total effect (including the indirect effect via corruption), we 
calculate the marginal effect of a 1% increase in the size of the shadow economy on local 
pollution at different levels of corruption (based on S.2.9 in Table 2). The results are reported 
in Figure 3. In the absence of corruption, a 1% increase in the size of shadow economy 
increases SO2 emissions by 1.47%. At the maximum level of corruption, SO2 emissions 
increase by 2.07%. Therefore, SO2 emissions increase by 40.8% when corruption increases 
from zero to its maximum score of six. These marginal effects are statistically significant at 
the 10% level, as shown by the dashed lines for the confidence intervals. This result suggests 
that controlling corruption significantly moderates the destructive effects of the shadow 
economy on local air pollution. 
Furthermore, other variables are statistically significant in almost all the specifications. For 
example, higher education (secondary school enrollment) significantly reduces the SO2 
emissions per capita (see columns S.2.8-S.2.10). This finding is in line with Scruggs (1998), 
Bimonte (2002), Rivera-Batiz (2002) and Farzin and Bond (2006). Another statistically 
significant variable with a negative effect on local air pollution is energy efficiency (measured 
as the GDP divided by energy consumption). Countries with more efficient production 
technologies can reduce the energy intensity of their industries and reduce the total local air 
pollution. We also find evidence that a higher proportion of a working age population (15 to 
64 years) increases local environmental pressures (see Columns S.2.6-S.2.10). When a high 
share of the population is working age, there is a large labor force, which is a necessary input 17 
 
for production. This demographic shift towards a working age population may feed activities 
in both the formal and the shadow economy, which leads to increases in environmental 
pollution.  
Figure 3. Marginal Effects of the Shadow Economy on SO2 Emissions per capita (using 
S.2.9 in Table 2) 
 
Note: The middle solid line shows the marginal impact of a 1% increase in the size of the shadow economy on 
SO2 emission per capita at different levels of corruption. The dashed lines are 90% confidence intervals (CIs).  
Another observation is the negative direct effect of corruption on pollution. Our theoretical 
model is not conclusive on the total effect of corruption on pollution. Proposition 4 states that 
the net effect of corruption on emissions is ambiguous. Corruption can increase pollution by 
affecting the stringency of environmental regulation and enforcement. However, corruption 
also has a negative impact on pollution by lowering economic activity (for the negative effect 
of corruption on growth, see Mauro, 1995, Knack and Keefer, 1995; Tanzi and Davoodi, 
2001; and Mo, 2001, among others). Cole (2007) evaluates the magnitude of these two 
countervailing effects of corruption on pollution and shows that, for the majority of countries, 
the negative effect of corruption outweighs the positive impact on pollution. In our setting, the 
final effect of corruption on pollution varies at different levels of the shadow economy. Our 
estimations show that the marginal impact of an increase in corruption on SO2 emissions is 
significantly positive when the size of the shadow economy is above the sample average. A 
1% increase in the corruption index increases the SO2 pollution per capita by 0.1% and 0.5% 
at the mean and maximum size of the shadow economy. Given a sizable shadow economy, 
higher corruption allows informal firms to continue their operations by bribing monitoring 18 
 
bureaucrats, thus allowing the emission of more pollution. When the shadow economy is of a 
negligible size, the effect of higher corruption on local pollution is negative (-0.2%) but not 
statistically significant, as observed from the confidence intervals in Figure 4.   
Figure 4. Marginal Effects of Corruption on SO2 Emissions per capita (using S.2.9 in 
Table 2) 
 
Note: The middle solid line shows the marginal impact of a 1% increase in the level of corruption on SO2 
emission per capita at different levels of the shadow economy. The dashed lines are 90% confidence intervals 
(CIs). Note that, for expositional purposes, we use a logarithm of corruption and that the shadow economy is 
shown in terms of the share of the GDP.  
CO2 Emissions as a Dependent Variable 
In line with our results for SO2, we notice a significantly positive and direct effect of the 
shadow economy on CO2 emissions per capita in all specifications (Table 3). In the baseline 
model (column S.3.9), a 1% increase in the size of the shadow economy increases CO2 
emissions per capita by 1.41% in the absence of corruption. Similar to our SO2 models, the 
increasing effect of the shadow economy on CO2 emissions is dependent on the level of 
corruption. The interaction term between the shadow economy and the corruption index is 
significantly positive; corruption amplifies the effect of the shadow economy on CO2 
emissions.  19 
 
Table 3. Shadow Economy and CO2 Emissions  
Panel with fixed country and time effects (OLS) 
Dependent variable: CO2 emission (metric tons per capita ) 
Independent variables  S.3.1  S.3.2 S.3.3 S.3.4 S.3.5 S.3.6  S.3.7 S.3.8 S.3.9  S.3.10 





























































































































































2  0.99  0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99 0.99 
Observations  797  694 678 678 678 678  636  565  537 698 
Number  of  countries  134  117 116 116 116 116  109  108  104 118 




As for the SO2 models, we can calculate the effect of a 1% increase in the size of the shadow 
economy at different levels of corruption. The results are illustrated in Figure 5. At the 
minimum, mean and maximum level of corruption, a 1% increase in the shadow economy 
increases CO2 emission per capita by 1.41, 1.70 and 1.95%, respectively. Again, the final 
effect of the shadow economy on CO2 emissions is positive and the control of corruption 
moderates this increasing effect. As shown by the confidence intervals (dashed lines), the 
total effect is significant at 10% for all levels of corruption. 
Several other variables are significant throughout most of the specifications. Higher 
urbanization and a larger share of the working age population significantly increase CO2 
emissions per capita and higher energy efficiency reduces emissions. In contrast to the SO2 
estimates, population density is a significant factor in the reduction of CO2 emissions. 
Education plays no significant role in our CO2 emission models. It seems that higher 
education has more policy relevance for local pollution when compared to environmental 
hazards beyond national boundaries.  
Figure 5. Marginal Effects of the Shadow Economy on CO2 Emissions per capita (using 
S.3.9 in Table 3) 
 
Note: The middle solid line shows the marginal impact of a 1% increase in the size of the shadow economy on 
CO2 emission per capita at different levels of corruption. The dashed lines are 90% confidence intervals (CIs). 21 
 
5. Robustness  Checks 
Europe and North America (EU & NA) and the Rest of the World  
As a robustness check for our analysis, we split the sample between Europe and North 
America (EU&NA) and the rest of the world.
19 The shadow economy in European and North 
American countries may be mostly due to tax evasion, whereas firms in low-income countries 
try to evade (environmental) regulations. Most shadow economy activities in EU&NA are 
concentrated in the service sector, such as cleaning and personal services. Thus, the 
destructive effect of the shadow economy on local pollution may not be comparable to its 
effect in developing countries. Hence, we may not be able to find a noticeable link between 
corruption and the shadow economy in EU&NA. 
Table 4 shows that the increasing effect of the shadow economy on local pollution (SO2) and 
interaction term with corruption are statistically significant only for the non-EU&NA 
countries. When we use CO2 emission per capita as a pollution indicator, the effect of the 
shadow economy is positive (increasing) and statistically significant in both cases (including 
and excluding EU&NA countries).  
Measurement Error 
Measurements of corruption and the shadow economy may contain some degree of error. 
Most previous studies measure corruption using instruments, such as ethnic fractionalization, 
legal origins and absolute latitude in cross-country frameworks. However, the main problem 
with these instruments is that they are constant over time for each country and therefore 
cannot be used in a panel data context. As it is difficult to find time-varying instruments for 
variables such as corruption and the shadow economy, Verbeek (2004, p.345) suggests an 
alternative route: “in many cases panel data will provide ‘internal’ instruments for regressors 
that are subject to measurement error. That is, transformations of the original variables can 
often be argued to be uncorrelated with the model’s error term and correlated with the 
explanatory variables themselves and no external instruments are needed”. In line with this 
proposal, we use 2 to 3 lags of corruption, the shadow economy and their interaction as 
instruments. Then, we employ the Durbin-Wu-Hausman specification test to discriminate 
between the two approaches (IV and OLS). We cannot reject the null hypothesis of no 
difference in OLS and IV estimates and thus, we infer that it is safe to use OLS.
20 
                                                 
19 We follow the classification of the World Bank. 
20 The tables with the regression results are omitted here but are available upon request from the authors. 22 
 
Table 4. Shadow Economy and Pollution in Different Regions 
Panel with fixed country and time effects (OLS) 
Dependent variable  CO2 per capita  SO2 per capita 
Independent variables EU&NA  Non-EU&NA EU&NA Non-EU&NA 


































































































2  0.97 0.99  0.97  0.97 
Observations  151 447  176  449 
Number of countries  27  91  27  80 
Note: White robust t-statistics are in parentheses.***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Constant term is included (not reported).  EU&NA 
stands for Europe and North America. 
Alternative Corruption Indicator 
To further test the robustness of our results, we employ the Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) of Transparency International (TI) as an alternative corruption index that is commonly 
used in the literature. CPI draws on different assessments and business opinion surveys 
carried out by independent and reputable institutions to capture information about the 
administrative and political aspects of corruption. Broadly speaking, the surveys include 
questions relating to bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, 
embezzlement of public funds and questions that probe the strength and effectiveness of 
public sector anti-corruption efforts. For a country or territory to be included in the index, a 23 
 
minimum of three of the sources that TI uses must assess that country. For example, the CPI 
from the year 2005 draws on 16 different polls and surveys from 10 independent 
institutions.
21 Some sources of the CPI Index, such as CU (State Capacity Survey by 
Columbia University), EIU (Economist Intelligence Unit), FH (Freedom House), MIG 
(Merchant International Group) and WMRC (World Markets Research Centre), mainly gather 
the perceptions of non-residents from developed countries and draw on their expert opinions 
about corruption in foreign countries. Other sources, such as II (Information International), 
are based on the expert opinions of non-residents who are predominantly from less-developed 
countries. The advantage of using non-residents’ opinions is that they are not vulnerable to a 
home country bias (Lambsdorff, 2007). Other sources include respondents who are nationals 
of the studied countries, such as IMD (Institute for Management Development), PERC 
(Political and Economic Risk Consultancy) and WEF (World Economic Forum).  
Lambsdorff (2007) shows that there is a significant correlation between the perception (CPI) 
and the actual experience of corruption. He shows that CPI correlates well with experienced-
based data sources, such as the International Crime Victim Survey. The ICVS respondents’ 
personal experience of corruption shows a correlation of over 0.80 with the CPI index of 
corruption. There is also a high correlation between major corruption indicators, such as PRS, 
CPI and World Bank (WGI). In our sample, the correlations between CPI, PRS and WGI are 
0.85, 0.96 and 0.85, respectively. These findings show that all of these indicators measure the 
same concept of corruption in public administration.  
Table 5 shows the results of the CPI approach. The direct effect of the shadow economy on 
local (SO2) and global (CO2) emission is positive and statistically significant and the 
amplifying effect of higher corruption is only observed for local air pollution. Hence, the 
main findings are robust to changes in the corruption measure.  
                                                 
21 For further details, see http://www.icgg.org/downloads/CPI_Methodology.pdf. 24 
 
Table 5. Alternative Corruption Index (CPI) 
Panel with fixed country and time effects (OLS) 
Dependent variable  SO2 per capita 
 
CO2 per capita 
 
Independent  variables      





















































































Adj.  R2  0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 
Observations  507 485 442 424 
Number  of  countries  108 105 116 111 
Note: White robust t-statistics are in parentheses.***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. Constant term is included (not reported). 
6. Conclusion 
Environmental damage has become a major obstacle to the improvement of living conditions 
in many developing countries. A large, informal sector may contribute significantly to 
environmental damage because it is, by definition, unregulated and involves activities that are 
particularly destructive to the environment. This paper studies the mechanism through which 
the shadow economy feeds environmental degradation. Our main idea is that corruption 
reinforces the damaging effects of the shadow economy. In our theoretical model, we show 
that the shadow economy increases local and global air pollution; however, this effect can be 
moderated by better control of corruption. To test this hypothesis, we use a reduced form 25 
 
econometric model and panel data covering the period from 1999-2005 for more than 100 
countries. We show that our theoretical prediction is supported by empirical evidence. In the 
different regressions, the marginal impact of the shadow economy on local and global air 
pollution is positive. However, this destructive effect can be significantly reduced by lowering 
the levels of corruption. For example, a reduction in the corruption score from 6 (most 
corrupt) in Zimbabwe (2005) to a score of 3 (as in neighboring Zambia) would reduce the 
destructive effects of a large shadow economy (which is approximately 50% of the GDP) and 
lower local air pollution by 17 percentage points. These findings imply that policy makers 
may have to address the effects of corruption and/or the main drivers of the shadow economy 
before increasing environmental standards and regulations. 26 
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Data Sources and Definitions 
Variable Definition  Source 
CO2 per 
capita 
Logarithm of CO2 emission (metric tons) per capita.  
Carbon dioxide emissions are those released by the 
burning of fossil fuels and the manufacture of 
cement. They include carbon dioxide produced 
during the consumption of solid, liquid and gas fuels 




SO2 per capita  Logarithm of SO2 emission per capita. Sulfur 
emissions from combustion and metal smelting can, 
in principle, be estimated using a bottom-up mass 
balance approach where emissions are equal to the 
sulfur content of the fuel (or ore) minus the amount 
of sulfur removed or retained in bottom ash or in 
products. Emissions were estimated annually by 
country for the following sectors: coal combustion, 
petroleum combustion, biomass combustion, 
shipping bunker fuels, metal smelting, natural gas 
processing and combustion, petroleum processing, 
pulp and paper processing, other industrial processes 
and agricultural waste burning (AWB). We divided 
the absolute amount of SO2 (Gg) by the population to 
calculate the per capita SO2.  
 
SO2 data from 
Smith et al. 
(2011) and total 
population from 
the World Bank 
(2011). 
shadow  Logarithm of the shadow economy (as % of GDP). 
Size of the shadow economy as a percent of the GDP 
calculated with MIMIC and currency demand 
estimation techniques. 
Causes: Share of direct taxation (in percent of GDP), 
share of indirect taxation and custom duties (in 
percent of GDP), regulatory quality (measures of the 
incidence of market-unfriendly policies, such as price 
controls or inadequate bank supervision as well as the 
perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive 
regulation in areas, such as foreign trade and business 
development), unemployment quota (% of total labor 
force), GDP p.c. (GDP per capita based on purchasing 
power parity (PPP; constant 2005 international $), 
business freedom (measures the time and efforts of 
business activity and ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 = 
least business freedom and 100 = maximum business 
freedom), fiscal freedom (measures the fiscal burden in 
an economy, i.e., the top tax rates on individual and 
corporate income and ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 = 
least fiscal freedom and 100 = maximum fiscal 
freedom), size of government (general government 
Schneider et al. 
(2010) 30 
 
final consumption expenditure (% of GDP)) and 
government effectiveness (captures perceptions of 
the quality of public services, the quality of civil 
service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies). 
Indicators: labor force participation rate, growth rate 
of GDP per capita, change of currency (growth rate 




Logarithm of GDP per unit of energy use (constant 




trade openness  Logarithm of trade openness. Trade is the sum of 
exports and imports of goods and services measured 










Logarithm of population density (people per sq. km).  World Bank 
(2011) 
pop1564  The logarithm of the population aged 15 to 64 is the 
percentage of the total population that is in the age 




second_enrol  School enrollment, secondary (% gross).  World Bank 
(2011) 
polity  Polity2 index, -10: fully non-democratic, 10: fully 
democratic. Rescaled from 0 (least democratic) to 1 
(most democratic). Logarithm of polity (rescaled plus 
1). 
Marshall et al. 
(2009) 
 
corruption   Corruption index of ICRG: actual or potential 
corruption in the form of excessive patronage, 
nepotism, job reservations, 'favor-for-favor', secret 
party funding and suspiciously close ties between 
politics and business. Rescaled from 0 (free of 
corruption) to 6 (highest level of corruption).  
An alternative indicator is Corruption Perception 
Index by Transparency International. The index 
ranges from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt). 
Recoded CPI index is used; higher scores indicate 
higher corruption.  








gdp p.c.  Logarithm of GDP per capita (current US$). GDP per 
capita is the GDP divided by the mid-year 
population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by 
all resident producers in the economy plus any 
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included 




making deductions for the depreciation of fabricated 
assets or for the depletion and degradation of natural 
resources. Data are in current U.S. dollars. 
  
manufacturing  Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP). 
Manufacturing refers to industries belonging to ISIC 
divisions 15-37. Value added is the net output of a 
sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting 
intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making 
deductions for the depreciation of fabricated assets or 
the depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
The origin of value added is determined by the 
International Standard Industrial Classification 




Appendix B: A Brief Review of Shadow Economy Estimations 
The MIMIC (multiple indicators multiple causes) models are based on Structural Equation 
Modeling. As the shadow economy is not directly observable, it is treated as a latent variable 
in this framework. Essentially, the latent variable (shadow economy) can be measured 
indirectly by estimating the link between the observable causes and measurable consequences 
of the shadow economy. The MIMIC model has two parts: the structural model and the 
measurement model. The structural model defines the link between the causal variables and 
the latent variable (shadow economy). The measurement model shows the relationship 
between the latent variable and its indicators.  Figure B1 illustrates the structure of the 
MIMIC model.  
In the estimations by Schneider et al. (2010), the main causes of the shadow economy are size 
of government, share of direct taxation, fiscal freedom, business freedom, unemployment rate, 
GDP per capita and government effectiveness index. The indicators of the shadow economy 
include the growth rate of GDP per capita, the labor force participation rate, the growth rate of 
the labor force and the domestic currency in circulation (i.e., cash outside the banking 
system). In the first step, Schneider et al. (2010) calculate an index of the shadow economy by 
multiplying the coefficients of the statistically significant coefficients in the structural part of 
model with the respective time series of causal variables. In the second step, they convert the 
ordinal index of the shadow economy into a cardinal index (relative size of the shadow 
economy in GDP) using a calibration procedure.  
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Figure B1. Structure of the MIMIC Model 
 
Note: The coefficients of the structural model and the measurement model are denoted by γ and 
 , respectively.  
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